Background
The origins of the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (now generally known as the TPP) lie in an agreement among three small Commonwealth member countries (Brunei Darussalam, New Zealand and Singapore) and Chile signed in 2006. The key characteristics of this agreement were that: (i) it was trans-Pacific; (ii) its planned coverage went beyond goods and tariffs to include services, investment, non-tariff barriers (NTBs), and government procurement (it was this coverage that led to the claim that it was the first 21st century agreement); (iii) it was an agreement between developed and developing countries (albeit middle income); and (iv) it was open to new members. It was not however until 2010 when it became an element in what became known as the USA's 'pivot to Asia' that the membership and ambition of TPP took off. Since then the potential membership has swollen to 12 with at least two other countries in the wings. 1 The economic diversity has grown with levels of development ranging from Vietnam at one end to Japan and the USA at the other.
The ultimate scope of this agreement or its membership is still unclear. In principle, all 21 members of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) are eligible including large countries like China, Indonesia, Thailand and Russia. Many of the current negotiating parties already have bilateral agreements with one or more of the other parties though none are as ambitious as is apparently proposed for TPP.
As the formation of a trading bloc can give rise to concerns for countries that are excluded from the arrangement, this issue of Commonwealth Trade Hot Topics makes an attempt to understand the implications arising from the TPP for such Commonwealth developing countries.
The objectives of and progress on the TPP are not always clearly spelled out. Post-negotiation statements tend to be general rather than specific. One of the clearest recent statements is the TPP Trade Ministers Report to Leaders of 8 October 2013 and that is the basis of what is discussed below. The general focus will be on the impact on trade in goods and to a lesser degree on services. This is at least in part because these are what matter most to Commonwealth developing countries. Issues such as investment, intellectual property rights (IPR) and government procurement leave alone environmental and labour standards are less directly relevant to Commonwealth developing countries in the short to medium term at least.
Market access effects
The effect on excluded countries, of market access aspects, from any free trade agreement (FTA) depends simultaneously on:
• the similarity of export structures between the excluded and those included in the agreement; and
• the height of tariff and non-tariff barriers currently applied to the exports of the new preferential partners and which will be removed or reduced after the agreement is signed.
As a corollary, if the current most favoured nation (MFN) tariffs applied by an included country, let us say the USA, is zero there will be no trade effect to displace the exports of an excluded country. Similarly, if the products exported by any excluded country and the members of any TPP agreement differ completely, the effect on the excluded country will be zero as there is no competition from the new preferences created by the TPP.
As a consequence, a first approximation of the likely effects of the TPP on the excluded countries can be obtained by comparing the export compositions and the height of the current barriers applied by TPP members. The task is complicated given the number of Commonwealth developing countries potentially affected, on one side, and the number of countries negotiating the TPP on the other. Nevertheless, we will try to provide a closer assessment by looking into some aggregated figures and indicators.
Trade shares
The first step in this analysis is to look what is the geographic distribution of the Commonwealth countries exports among TPP members. Leaving aside other considerations for the moment, the higher is the value of the Commonwealth exports into any of the countries negotiating the TPP, the higher the expected effect on them of the TPP. Presentation of all the combinations of FK indices between all the countries involved is complex. Therefore, we will focus our attention on the most interesting cases that we have identified.
In general, the overlapping of exports categories between Commonwealth members and the TPP bilateral exports is very low, indicating different trade and production structures between these two groups. This reinforces the perception that the effects of the TPP on the Commonwealth developing countries are likely to be small. Nevertheless, some exceptions can be identified.
Mexico, Peru and Vietnam have relatively similar (above 10%) export structures to the Commonwealth countries, notably to the USA. This holds for Africa, the Caribbean (especially into Canada), Asia and India. Bangladesh overlaps significantly with Vietnam in Japan, Canada, the USA and Other TPP members' group. Vietnam also presents high similarity with Pakistan in Canada and the USA. Finally, Japan, New Zealand and the USA present higher similarity with India into Australia. Although the rest of the combinations present smaller values and are omitted, there remains the possibility that an industry of particular importance to an individual Commonwealth developing country outside TPP may compete directly with an industry benefited by the TPP in TPP importers involved. This will require a much finer analysis and deeper study.
The other dimension is the size of the preferential partner's exports to other members of the TPP. If they are large relative to the exports of the excluded country to the TPP group the excluded country might be forced out of the market or to reduce export prices to remain competitive. This means that in addition or instead, a terms of trade effect might also hit the excluded countries. This would require careful Commonwealth-exporter-byproduct-by-TPP-importer analysis using indicators of relative size and overlap. 4
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Services trade
The TPP states aim to liberalise services trade (and inward investment rules) by means of a negative list approach, that is, all services products on the list will remain protected and the rest will be liberalised. The key question is whether this liberalisation is
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Some sense of the degree of protection against services imports can be drawn from the World Bank Services Trade Restrictions Database. Information is available for 10 of the 12 TPP members and the overall average scores are shown in Table 4 .
For some of the Commonwealth members notably India and the Caribbean countries, services constitute an important economic and trade sector. On the other hand, it seems that there is more to liberalise in the TPP region in the context of services than in goods. This suggests that the effects on the services exports to the TPP may not be negligible for some Commonwealth countries. Much will depend on whether liberalisation of services sectors not on the negative list is implemented preferentially or erga omnes. The impact on Commonwealth developing countries outside the TPP will also depend on whether the negative list (i.e. sectors excluded from liberalisation) includes sectors of importance to the excluded Commonwealth countries. In that case there will be no new preferences and no potential diversion of trade.
The first problem is the lack of data on services trade from both, Commonwealth members and developed countries. As a result it is very hard to compare trade structures in services. Moreover, it is difficult to assess the importance of the TPP countries as destinations for services exports from the Commonwealth members. However, some incomplete information can be found for some of the TPP countries (see Table 5 ).
Further, given the lack of data and of information about how the negotiations are progressing, not much can be said about the effects on the services sectors exports from the Commonwealth nonmembers as a consequence of the TPP agreement.
Our tentative conclusion on market access elements of goods and services is that there are no strong indications that there will be serious trade diversion losses for the Commonwealth exporters of goods and services to the TPP countries. However, the aggregate statistics may be missing effects at the product level (6 digit and finer for goods and 3 digit for services) from specific TPP exporters in particular TPP markets. To understand such competitive challenges, one would require drilling down by country-by partner-by competitorby product disaggregated analysis.
Further, it is not clear how non-tariff barriers will change as a result of any integration of sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) and technical barriers to trade (TBT) measures across TPP. Much will depend on whether the approach chosen is harmonisation or mutual recognition. Harmonisation even if to stricter norms might offer a reduction in compliance costs as 12 markets become a single regulatory area. However, given different preferences and levels of development it may be hard for the TPP countries to find a point of balance. The Australians or the Japanese might find it hard to relax existing SPS standards to accommodate members with less well developed infrastructure for testing and certification. Equally mutual recognition has proved difficult to implement in the EU and across the Atlantic and may mean little effective discrimination against non-members as local regulators insist on demanding that local norms are complied with.
Investment policies
As with services, the TPP negotiations are focused on liberalising inward investment flows by means of a negative list. The first issue will be what sectors will be on each countries' list and how wide the exclusions are. The effect of a deep agreement on investment provisions could open up important sectors in the TPP region especially in 'key or strategic sectors' such as air transport, media or telecommunications. Very little information is, however, available on the direction of the negotiation in this aspect. As in the case of services, the potential for investment diversion away from Commonwealth states depends on how the agreements are implemented. If the result of the TPP is ambitious in terms of increased flexibility on investment, in the short run, flows normally going to developing countries might be redirected to the TPP countries with the objective of taking advantage of the newer opportunities created. Nevertheless, for some Commonwealth members it may be necessary to adapt and update some of their investment provisions in order to compete for foreign direct investment (FDI) from both developed and large developing countries. It may also depend on whether the negative lists are preferential to TPP members or erga omnes. Paradoxically erga omnes may be more diverting since non-members might invest in TPP states to take advantage of the larger market -but rules of origin may be an important disincentive to third country FDI. In the longer term, however, effects may be small if capital markets remain liquid, that is, there is no global 'lump of capital'.
Could the TPP help to open other markets?
There are other liberalisation negotiations in process, most notably the multilateral Doha Development Agenda (DDA) and the plurilateral Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) taking place in the margins of the DDA, as well as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), the other 'mega regional'. The key point about TTIP, TPP and TiSA is that they are major initiatives promoted by the USA (and the EU in the case of TTIP and TiSA). Importantly, as they stand they exclude the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). The main question is whether the combination of TiSA, TTIP and TPP reaching beyond the WTO's ambitions will encourage the big emerging markets to make important liberalisation requests and offers on Agriculture, NAMA (non-agricultural market access) and Services in Geneva, and how the USA and EU might react if they did. In the meantime the responses to more bilateral agreements are more bilateral agreements. If the BRICS do make such a move it would be important that they were supported by Commonwealth developing countries. The key bulwark against any trade and investment diverting effects of mega regionals and plurilaterals is MFN liberalisation. The danger, in the absence of a re-energisation of the multilateral process, is a fragmentation of the global system economically and politically. For developing countries an increase in non-discriminatory liberalisation at home and abroad is the best policy. It maximises the economic benefits of liberalisation and minimises (but does not eliminate) the opportunities for the big and rich to dominate the trade system.
Conclusions
Much is still obscure about the coverage and detail of any TPP agreement. It promises much but equally much seems still to be agreed. It also faces domestic resistance, notably in the USA but also in Japan. Many of the potential members already have bilateral FTAs with each other so there may be little change in preference margins.
On goods, Vietnam and to a lesser extent Peru, Mexico and Malaysia may present the greatest threat of trade diversion to Commonwealth developing countries in developed TPP markets. But for Commonwealth Asia and Africa current market shares in TPP markets tend to be low. Caribbean and Pacific Island exports are more TPP intensive.
TPP members plan to liberalise services and investment sectors by means of a negative list. For services the impact on Commonwealth exporters will depend on whether such liberalisation is preferential or erga omnes.
On investment, the choice between preferential liberalisation or not may be less important than the extent to which rules of origin discourage foreign direct investment. In the shorter term there may be some investment diversion but in the longer term we see no global 'lump of capital'.
On response to the TPP (and TTIP and TiSA) the ideal would involve a rapid and dynamic resuscitation of multilateral negotiations led by the excluded countries, above all the BRICS and Commonwealth developing countries, aimed at substituting for TPP or at least eroding the effects of new preferences and regulatory approximation. ITRC is entrusted with the responsibilities of undertaking policy-oriented research and analysis on trade and development issues and providing informed inputs into the related discourses involving Commonwealth members. The ITRC approach is to scan the trade and development landscape for areas where orthodox approaches are ineffective or where there are public policy failures or gaps, and to seek heterodox approaches to address those. Its work plan is flexible to enable quick response to emerging issues in the international trading environment that impact particularly on two highly vulnerable Commonwealth constituencies -least developed countries (LDCs) and small states.
Scope of ITRC Work
ITRC undertakes activities principally in three broad areas:
• It supports Commonwealth developing members in their negotiation of multilateral and regional trade agreements that promote development friendly outcomes, notably their economic growth through expanded trade.
• It conducts policy research and consultations increase understanding of the changing of the international trading environment and of policy options for successful adaptation.
• It contributes to the processes involving the multilateral and bilateral trade regimes that advance the more beneficial participation of Commonwealth developing country members, particularly small states and LDCs. 
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